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residence after being abandoned during a temporary sojourn in
New York seemingly can successfully sue for support and invoke in
personam jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(b). In contrast, a
party who was married in New York and resided here for several
years before establishing a matrimonial domicile elsewhere cannot,
without more, obtain personal jurisdiction in this State under the
statute.
A suggested solution to this anomalous situation is judicial or
legislative construction of a formula, based on the length of time
the parties maintained their matrimonial domicile in New York, to
decide whether sufficient fundamental contacts with this State exist
to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants. In the absence of such a formula, decisions based on
the Lieb interpretation may serve to promote injustice rather than
prevent it.
ARTICLE 32 - ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3218(d): Execution of confession ofjudgment by an agent held to be
binding against personal assets of indebted partners.
CPLR 3218(d) permits one or more joint debtors to confess
judgment on a joint debt.63 Although such a judgment may be
entered and enforced solely against the personal assets of the
confessing debtor,64 execution of a judgment against less than all
63 CPLR 3218(d) provides:
One or more joint debtors may confess a judgment for a joint debt due or to
become due. Where all the joint debtors do not unite in the confession, the
judgment shall be entered and enforced against only those who confessed it and it is
not a bar to an action against the other joint debtors upon the same demand.
CPLR 3218 permits a debtor to confess judgment for a present or future monetary
debt. Such confessions have two primary purposes: First, they act as a "short cut to judgment
where the defendant concedes liability," and wishes to avoid the time and expense of a civil
action, 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3218, commentary at 1036 (1970); and, second, they serve as
a security device for the protection of creditors' claims, even before a debt is due. See id.; 10
CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 68:1, at 214-15 (1966); 4 WK&M T 3218.01. If the entire debt is not
due at the time of confession, the judgment is enforceable against only that portion of the
obligation which has matured. The judgment, however, remains in effect and acts as security
for the monies due subsequent to the initial entry and execution of the judgment. CPLR
3218(c); see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3218, commentary at 1036 (1970).
Procedurally, to confess judgment, the debtor must execute an affidavit stating the
amount due, authorizing the entry of judgment, and describing the factual situation in
which the debt arose. CPLR 3218(a)(1)-(2). The affidavit must also state "the county where
the [defendant-debtor] resides, or if he is a nonresident, the county in which entry [of
judgment] is authorized." CPLR 3218(a)(1). Once the affidavit is executed, the creditor has 3
years to enter judgment. The 3-year period may, however, be shortened by the death of the
defendant-debtor. CPLR 3218(b). For a detailed discussion of the confession of judgment
procedure, see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3218, commentary at 1039-45 (1970).
64 See, e.g., Schenson v. I. Shainin & Co., 243 App. Div. 638, 276 N.Y.S. 881 (2d Dep't)
(per curiam), aff'd mem., 268 N.Y. 567, 198 N.E. 407 (1935) (judgment against nonexecuting
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joint obligors does not preclude a creditor from instituting a subse-
quent action against the remainder.6 5 Courts normally require
strict compliance with the statutory requirements for filing a con-
fession of judgment,66 resolving all ambiguities in favor of the
debtor.6
Recently, in Besen v. Kelley, 68 the Supreme Court, Westchester
County, held that a confession of judgment executed by an agent
of a partnership was sufficient to bind the individual partners.
69
Plaintiff-debtors had moved for a preliminary injunction to stay
enforcement of the judgment against their personal assets,7 0 con-
tending that since they had not personally confessed judgment,71
joint debtor vacated); Scanlon v. Kuehn, 225 App. Div. 256, 232 N.Y.S. 592 (2d Dep't 1929)
(confession cannot be basis of personal judgment against nonsigning debtor); Boyce
Hardware Co. v. Saunders, 119 Misc. 365, 196 N.Y.S. 259 (Sup. Ct. Allegany County 1922)
(creditor cannot execute judgment against property jointly owned by confessing and non-
confessing debtors). But see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3218, commentary at 1048-49 (1970),
where Professor David Siegel states that a judgment creditor may be able to reach a
confessing debtor's interest in jointly held partnership assets by use of a "charging order."
65 CPLR 3218(d). See Bloom v. Kapps, 73 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947),
wherein the court expressly recognized the right of a creditor to bring suit against noncon-
fessing debtors.
6 See, e.g., County Nat'l Bank v. Vogt, 28 App. Div. 2d 793, 794, 280 N.Y.S.2d 1016,
1019 (3d Dep't 1967) (mem.); American Cities Co. v. Stevenson, 187 Misc. 107, 110, 60
N.Y.S.2d 685, 688 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1946). Rigid conformity with the statutory re-
quirements of the contents of the affidavit is aimed primarily at protecting third party
creditors against a debtor's collusive attempt to create the appearance that he is judgment
proof. See, e.g., Giryluk v. Giryluk, 30 App. Div. 2d 22, 25, 289 N.Y.S.2d 458, 460 (Ist Dep't
1968) (per curiam); Granville v. Gratzer, 200 Misc. 738, 739, 105 N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 281 App. Div. 514, 120 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1st Dep't
1953); 4 WK&M 3218.03.
67 See notes 76-80 and accompanying text infra.
63 83 Misc. 2d 362, 373 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1975).
69 Id. at 364, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
70 Plaintiffs were four doctors doing business as Cross County Hospital, a partnership.
Their agent, Max Manus, was the hospital administrator delegated with responsibility for the
day-to-day management of the hospital. Id. at 363, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 766. Manus' duties, as
found by the court in a prior hearing, included all dealings with the defendant labor union.
Kelley v. Besen, No. 09379 (Sup. CL Westchester County, July 16, 1975).
The confession in dispute was predicated upon a prior debt due defendants under the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The agreement had been negotiated and signed
by Manus as agent of the partnership. Holding that the defendants had the right to rely on
Manus' authority to confess judgment, the court found that although Manus had not been
expressly authorized to confess judgment, he possessed either apparent or implied authority
to do so. Id. at 3. The court defined apparent authority "as that authority which the principal
holds the agent out as possessing or which he permits the agent to represent that he
possesses and which the principal is estopped to deny." Id. Implied authority was defined by
the court as "actual authority circumstantially proved .... Id. at 2. It has also been defined
as the power "implied or inferred from the words used, from customs and from the relation
of the parties." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7, comment c at 29 (1957).
71 83 Misc. 2d at 364, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 767. A further contention of the plaintiffs was
that since they were not personally served with a summons, execution could not be had
against them individually. Id. at 363, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 766. This argument was based upon
CPLR 5201(b), which states in pertinent part:
A money judgment entered upon a joint liability of two or more persons may be
1976]
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CPLR 3218(d) prohibited execution of the judgment against their
individual assets. Plaintiffs also argued that inasmuch as CPLR
3218(a) requires that the affidavit confessing judgment be signed
and sworn to by the debtor to be charged, the affidavit executed by
an agent could not bind the individual partners. 72 The court,
however, rejected these arguments and held that the agent of the
partnership was simultaneously the agent of each partner.73 There-
fore, the agent's signature on the affidavit became the equivalent of
the individual signature of each partner,7 4 rendering each partner
personally liable to the defendant-creditor.
It is submitted that the Besen court's rationale is contrary to the
weight of authority both in this jurisdiction and in others.75 The
courts have realized that confessions of judgment, predicated as
they are upon private agreement, are prone to abuse since one
party is typically in a disadvantageous bargaining position.7 6 In
enforced aainst individual property of those persons summoned and joint prop-
erty of such persons with any other persons against whom judgment is entered.
The Besen court noted that service of summons was unnecessary since judgments by confes-
sion are predicated upon the debtor consenting in advance to the jurisdiction of the court.
83 Misc. 2d at 363, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 766, citing Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219,
250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969). See also American Cities Co. v. Stevenson, 187
Misc. 107, 60 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1946). Some commentators believe that
confessions of judgment may present due process problems. For a discussion of these fears,
see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3218, commentary at 1044-45 (1970), citing Atlas Credit Corp. v.
Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
2 Prior to the enactment of CPLR 3218, a verified statement executed by the defendant
was required. The affidavit presently required by the CPLR is the equivalent of such
statement. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3218, commentary at 1040 (1970). See FIRST REP. 107-08.
Pursuant to CPLR 3218, the debtor himself must personally execute the affidavit. This
requirement is designed to ensure that the debtor is aware of both "the claim he is
confessing and the effect of his action." Id. at 108; accord, P.A. Starck Piano Co. v. O'Keefe,
211 App. Div. 700, 208 N.Y.S. 350 (1st Dep't 1925) (voiding a judgment confessed under
power of attorney where attorney verified statement without consulting with his principal);
Flatbush Auto Discount Corp. v. Reich, 190 Misc. 817, 75 N.Y.S.2d 908 (App. T. 1st Dep't
1947); Asphalt Pavers Inc. v. Consentino, 53 Misc. 2d 613, 279 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Nassau
County Dist. Ct. 1967). Curiously, however, the Besen court held that the agent's signature
satisfied this requirement. 83 Misc. 2d at 364, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
" 83 Misc. 2d at 363, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 767, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 20(e) (1957).
"' 83 Misc. 2d at 364, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
75 Careful judicial inspection of confessions ofjudgment to ensure strict compliance with
the statutory procedure has been the rule both in New York and in other jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Rae v. Kestenberg, 23 App. Div. 2d 565, 256 N.Y.S.2d 737 (2d Dep't) (mem.), affd mein.,
16 N.Y.2d 1023, 213 N.E.2d 315, 265 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1965); 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3218,
commentary at 1038 (1970). Furthermore, 17 states have abolished confessions of judgment
in the belief that the possible benefits of the procedure are outweighed by potential abuses
by creditors. See H. PETERFREUND & J. McLAUGHLIN, NEW YORK PRACTICE 1028 n.6 (3d ed.
1973). See generaUy Hurshman, The Power of a Partner to Confess Judgment Against the Partner-
ship in Pennsylvania, 62 U. PA. L. REv. 621 (1914).
76 See 4 WK&M 3218.04. Professor David Siegel has noted that "there is an increasing
awareness [on the part of the courts] that the debtor's position is the weaker one vis- -vis his
creditor .... " 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3218, commentary at 1045 (1970).
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order to prevent possible overreaching by creditors, the courts
have adopted a liberal attitude in favor of the judgment debtor,
subjecting confessions of judgment to close judicial scrutiny. 77
Thus, the rule is well established that "[a]uthority to confess judg-
ment without process must be clear and explicit .. . ,",78 for any
ambiguities regarding authorization will be resolved against the
creditor.7 9 Through the use of these safeguards, the courts attempt
to ascertain whether the debtor is aware of the fact that he is
actually confessing judgment, the claim to which he is confessing,
and the possible ramifications of his action.80
In contrast to the cautious position taken by other courts, the
decision in Besen takes an unprecedented and expansive approach
by enforcing a confession of judgment against all the individual
joint debtors where, as a practical matter, unanimity of execution is
lacking. By holding a confession entered without clear and explicit
authorization valid, the court has placed the joint debtor in an
unenviable position. In effect, the Besen court held that apparent
authority alone is a sufficient basis for enforcing a judgment
against a principal confessed by his agent.81 In order to avoid such
a possibility, the debtor Would have to provide notice to every
creditor stating the precise scope of his agent's authority. It is
submitted that because judgment by confession is an unusual act, in
the usual case, there is no apparent authority sufficient to sustain a
confession of judgment.8 2
7 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3218, commentary at 1038 (1970); 4 WK&M 1 3218.04. See,
e.g., Rae v. Kestenberg, 23 App. Div. 2d 565, 256 N.Y.S.2d 737 (2d Dep't) (mem.), aff'd mem.,
16 N.Y.2d 1023, 213 N.E.2d 315, 265 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1965).
78 14 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1724, at 910 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1972).
79 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3218, commentary at 1038 (1970).
1o For illustrations of these safeguards, see Wood v. Mitchell, 117 N.Y. 439, 22 N.E.
1125 (1889) (voiding confession of judgment where statement was indefinite); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Schickler, 199 App. Div. 74, 191 N.Y.S. 194 (4th Dep't 1921)
(vacating confession of judgment entered by creditor's attorneys pursuant to power of
attorney); Flatbush Auto Discount Corp. v. Reich, 190 Misc. 817, 75 N.Y.S.2d 908 (App. T.
1st Dep't 1947) (confession of judgment voided because not verified by defendant); Ameri-
can Cities Co. v. Stevenson, 187 Misc. 107, 60 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1946)
(denying plaintiff's application for an order directing the filing of confession of judgment
because statute of limitations had run).
8' Of course, the apparent authority to confess judgment would have to be based on the
conduct of the principal and not merely on the conduct of the agent. For a principal to be
held liable for the acts of an agent, the principal must be responsible for the appearance of
authority in the agent to engage in such conduct. Ford v. Unity Hosp., 32 N.Y.2d 464, 472,
299 N.E.2d 659, 664, 346 N.Y.S.2d 238, 244 (1973). In the case at bar, it is conceivable that
since the partners allowed Manus to conduct all business transactions with the defendants,
see note 70 supra, the defendants' belief that Manus had authority to confess judgment was
reasonable. Kelley v. Besen, No. 09379 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, July 16, 1975).82 See Everson v. Gehrman, I Abb. Pr. 167 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1854); note 86 infra.
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There exists, however, another and more fundamental reason
for questioning the Besen decision. Section 20 of the New York
Partnership Law provides that every partner is an agent of the
partnership for the purpose of conducting the ordinary and usual
course of business.83 The section further states that a partner,
unless authorized by the unanimous consent of his associates, has
no authority, either implied or apparent, to confess judgment bind-
ing either the partnership or the nonconfessing partners. 84 Thus,
the Partnership Law is consistent with CPLR 3218(d) in that the
confession is enforceable solely against the confessing parties.
85
One would therefore assume that since a partner, as agent of the
partnership, is incapable of confessing a judgment binding upon
his copartners, 86 a person acting as a general agent of the partner-
ship would similarly be without this power.8 7 Nevertheless, the
Besen court, which failed to take cognizance of partnership princi-
83 N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 20(1) (McKinney 1948). This section also provides that the
execution of any instrument in the partnership name by a partner binds the partnership if it
is done in the usual course of partnership business. Id.; see Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N.Y. 445,
198 N.E. 23 (1935). The Caplan Court stated: "'[Elach partner acts, as to himself, as a
principal having a joint interest in the partnership property, and, as to each other partner, as
general agent.' "Id. at 450, 198 N.E. at 26, quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Farson, 226 N.Y. 218,
221, 123 N.E. 490, 492 (1919). See also People v. Esrig, 240 App. Div. 300, 270 N.Y.S. 372
(3d Dep't 1934); A. BROMBERG & J. CRANE, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 48, at 272-73 (1968).
84 N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 20(3)(d) (McKinney 1948).
85 Scanlon v. Kuehn, 225 App. Div. 256, 232 N.Y.S. 592 (2d Dep't 1929). InScanlon, the
plaintiff was denied recovery against a nonsigning partner although the confession was
executed in the partnership name by a copartner. In Stoutenburgh v. Vandenburgh, 7 How.
Pr. 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany County 1852), the court held that judgment by confession may
only be entered against a partner who actually signs the confession. See generally A. BRON,-
BERG & J. CRANE, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 52, at 299-301 (1968); 20 CARMODY-WAIT 2d
§ 122.14, at 785-86 (1967).
86 It has long been established that express authority is necessary for a partner to
confess a judgment binding upon his copartners since it is an unusual act not within the
day-to-day business of the partnership. See Everson v. Gehrman, 1 Abb. Pr. 167 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1854) (partner's power to confess judgment against other partners must be express); A.
BROMBERG & J. CRANE, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 52, at 296, 300-01 (1968) (confession of
judgment generally held to be outside implied powers of a partner); F. MECHEM, ELEMENTS
OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS § 262, at 232 (1920); 1 S. ROWLEY, PARTNERSHIP § 9.3, at
329-30 (2d ed. R. Rowley 1960) (partner cannot bind partnership or other partners by
confessing judgment without being delegated special authority to do so).
87 A principal cannot delegate authority to an agent which he himself does not possess.
In re Estate of Peters, 71 Misc. 2d 662, 336 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. Cattaraugus County
1972). Further, as was noted by the Court of Appeals,
the mere creation of an agency for some purpose does not automatically invest the
agent with "apparent authority" to bind the principal without limitation. An agent's
power to bind his principal is coextensive with the principal's grant of authority.
One who deals with an agent does so at his peril, and must make the necessary
effort to discover the actual scope of authority.
Ford v. Unity Hosp., 32 N.Y.2d 464, 472, 299 N.E.2d 659, 664, 346 N.Y.S.2d 238, 244
(1973) (citations omitted). It therefore follows that since a partner cannot confess judgment
against the partnership or the other partners, he likewise cannot achieve this power by
authorizing an agent to act in his stead.
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ples, reached the opposite conclusion. Hopefully, its holding will
not be followed in the future.
ARTICLE 52- ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5201: Seider jurisdiction asserted in case involving both resident
and nonresident plaintiffs.
That a nonresident's insurance policy issued by an insurer
doing business in New York may be attached by a New York
plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction in a suit based on
an out-of-state accident was first recognized by the Court of Ap-
peals in Seider v. Roth. 88 It is now well established as the law of New
York.89 Nevertheless, Seider attachment continues to receive criti-
cism from commentators9" and to create problems for courts
88 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). In Seider, a New York
resident used CPLR 5201 and CPLR 6202 to attach an out-of-state defendant's automobile
insurance policy, claiming that the insurer, who was doing business in New York, had an
obligation to defend and indemnify the defendant, and that this obligation was an attachable
debt.
" The constitutionality of Seider was upheld in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106
(2d Cir. 1968), affid en bane, 410 F.2d 117, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). Much of the
criticism of Seider stressed the lack of due process inherent in a suit which compels the
defendant-insured, as well as his insurer, to litigate in a forum which was not connected with
the underlying accident, thereby going beyond the jurisdictional "minimum contacts" test
laid down by the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945). Even though the Seider attachment of an insurance policy is a quasi-in-rem action,
and the minimum contacts theory is normally associated with in personam jurisdiction, it is
not improper to assess jurisdiction over an intangible res in terms of fairness and contacts
with the state. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957) (en banc),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958) (jurisdiction over a chose in action based upon a totality of
the contacts). Using such an analysis, the majorities in Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d
305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), rehearing denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d
319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968), and Minichiello considered the New York residency of the
injured plaintiff and the presence of the insurer within New York sufficient contacts with
this State to allow quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Furthermore, these courts reasoned that neither
the insured nor the insurer are substantially prejudiced by a New York adjudication since
the insurer is already present in the State, has contracted to defend the insured anywhere at
anytime, and the insured will be reimbursed for expenses incurred in cooperation with the
defense. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d at 118-19; Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at
311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
As long as the Supreme Court decision in Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), remains
valid law, it is unlikely that Seider will be overturned on constitutional grounds. Harris
allowed the garnishment of a debt wherever the debtor may be found. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has had opportunities to declare Seider unconstitutional, but has declined to
grant certiorari in every instance. See, e.g., Victor v. Lyon Associates Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 695, 234
N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1967), appeal dismissed for want of a substantialfederal question,
393 U.S. 7 (1968). For further discussion of the constitutionality of Seider, see Note, Seider v.
Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 58 (1968).
DoSee, e.g., 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5201, commentary at 16-76, (Supp. 1975); Note,
Jurisdiction in New York. A Proposed Reform, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1412 (1969); Comment,
Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 550 (1967); Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1108
